Taiwan’s offshore wind R3.3: the NT$30 billion pledge that won full points also decides a licence year

In Taiwan’s third phase of zonal offshore wind development, R3.3, the local-procurement figure that won an applicant all 10 local-benefit points, NT$30 billion per 500 MW, is also the figure its final contract template uses to grant, or withhold, a year on its electricity licence (電業執照). The points went to a commitment of NT$30 billion of local procurement and investment (在地採購及投資金額) per 500 MW applied for, to be delivered before completion and grid connection; NT$20 billion earned 5. The template grants the 12 months, on the ministry’s audit, to a developer that performs the commitments in its plan, completes by the deadline in its allocation notice and has spent NT$30 billion per 500 MW of the capacity allocated. A shortfall not made up by the ministry’s deadline costs a punitive penalty (懲罰性違約金) of 20% of the gap, and the ministry can claim penalties beyond the performance security (履約保證金).^{1, 3, 4}

For a pledge of exactly NT$30 billion per 500 MW, the reward and the penalty turn on the same figure: deliver all of it, with the rest of the plan and by the deadline, and the licence runs a year longer; end the audit short of it and that year is gone, while any gap not made up by the ministry’s deadline is charged at 20%. The size of the pledge was a financial position, taken at application and settled years later on audited figures.

R3.3 closed for applications at 17:00 on 30 September 2026, and as of 19 October 2026 the ministry’s Energy Administration had published no allocation result.^{2, 6, 7}

The performance-capability review gave 35 points for developer track record, 30 for developer financial capability and 35 for project execution capability, the last made up of execution progress 15, ESG planning 15 and energy resilience 5. Local benefits carried 10 of the 15 ESG points, environmental sustainability 3 and corporate social responsibility 2. An application needed a total of 70 points or more to qualify. Qualified applications were then ranked by total score, and capacity was allocated in that order, first to the first-ranked application, then to the second, and so on. Points above the qualifying line therefore bought a place in the queue for capacity.¹

Each applicant could file one application, for between 300,000 kW and 1,000,000 kW. Because the pledge was judged per 500 MW, a larger application needed a proportionally larger commitment for the same points. For local suppliers, that makes the pledge local procurement and investment the developer must deliver before its farm is completed and connected. Energy resilience had a pledge of its own, scaled the same way: NT$1.6 billion invested within five years after completion and grid connection scored 2 points and NT$2.5 billion scored 5.¹

A selected applicant does not sign up to its plan’s figure as such: under the allocation rules as amended on 27 March 2026, the amount written into its administrative contract, the ESG local amount (ESG 在地金額), is the plan’s commitment multiplied by the wind farm’s obligation-capacity ratio, the capacity allocated divided by the capacity applied for. The reward scales actual spending back to 500 MW, multiplying it by 500 MW divided by the capacity allocated, and gives 12 months at NT$30 billion and one month more for each further NT$1 billion. We put each such further month, for an assumed 1,000 MW allocation, at another NT$2 billion of audited local spending. The ratios fit together: a developer that spends exactly its ESG local amount lands on the figure it was scored on, whatever share of its capacity it was allocated.^{1, 3}

The reward is granted on the ministry’s audit, and only to a developer that performs the commitments in its plan and completes and connects its whole capacity by 31 December of the completion year in its allocation notice. In all it is capped at five years: early completion adds its days, and energy resilience adds a month at NT$2.5 billion and another at NT$3 billion, measured the same way. We read the template’s wording as putting more at stake than the local months: performing the plan is a condition of the whole reward, so a local shortfall could also cost the early-completion days and the resilience months.^{1, 3}

The same contract lets a developer that has installed all its foundations, or connected 50% of its capacity, by that deadline finish in the following year, but the reward is tied to the original deadline, not to that extra year. Delay penalties are measured as shares of the security: 10% of the total allocated-capacity security for each month late on the establishment permit or the work permit, and 5% a month late on completion, rising to 10% a month from the seventh month. A farm that misses the original deadline loses the whole reward even if it qualifies for the extra year, and one late on completion pays the monthly penalty as well.^{1, 3}

The ESG local amount is reported on as it is spent and audited by the ministry after completion: within six months after financing is in place the developer files an implementation plan (落實計畫), then reports by the end of March and of September until completion, each report with a CPA’s special-audit attestation, and files its evidence for the ministry’s audit after completion. The actual spending a shortfall is measured against is the total the ministry recognises after that audit.³

If the ESG local amount is not delivered and the gap is not made up by the ministry’s deadline, the punitive penalty is 20% of the gap. In a serious case (情節重大), where execution reports are late or progress lags and is not put right within the next three reporting periods, the ministry may claim up to a further 10%, with the two capped together at 30% of the gap. The template sets out a route for a developer that cannot perform: with supporting evidence, it may ask the ministry to agree to change its ESG or energy-resilience obligations, and must then update its implementation plans.^{3, 4}

An unremedied shortfall in the energy-resilience amount costs 20% of its own gap. The environmental and social measures are priced as shares of the security instead: each one not delivered and not remedied costs 10% of the total allocated-capacity security divided by the number of measures in its category, at least 2% of the security, with each category capped at 10% of the security. Only the two investment pledges are penalised on their own size, so only their penalties grow with the commitment.³

Nor does the security set a ceiling: the ministry may claim penalties beyond the allocated-capacity security, and the developer gives up its Civil Code defence that an excessive punitive penalty should be reduced (酌減之抗辯). The security itself is NT$2,000,000 per MW, at least 50% of it paid before a selected applicant applies to sign the administrative contract and the rest within one year of signing or one month after project financing is in place, whichever comes first.^{1, 3}

The penalty grows with the pledge and the shortfall; the security does not.

The allocation rules set the phase at 3,600,000 kW “as a principle” (為原則), for completion and grid connection in 2030 and 2031. Applications could be delivered by hand or by registered mail, the postmark counting.^{1, 2}

By the close, the ministry reported in-person applications from 2 development teams for 2 wind farms; applications by registered post also count. The Energy Administration said factors including developers’ global investment plans and the selection timetable not fitting together had indirectly affected willingness to take part. For the applicants, their lenders and their local suppliers, the pledge was fixed in the application: an allocation would scale it, and a change would need the ministry’s agreement. As of 19 October 2026, the Energy Administration had published no allocation result: its renewable energy laws and notices page, where the phase 1 and phase 2 results are listed, shows none for phase 3, and none of its news releases after 30 September 2026 concerns the round. Its release of 30 September 2026, the last on the round, said it planned to complete the selection and publish the allocation by the end of 2026.^{5, 6, 7}

ListingMinds, “Taiwan’s offshore wind R3.3: the NT$30 billion pledge that won full points also decides a licence year”, 30 October 2026. https://www.listingminds.com/energy/field-notes/taiwan-offshore-wind-r3-3-local-commitments