Capacity and flexibility · Field note
Great Britain’s LDES cap and floor: winning an award does not fix what the floor is worth
The default floor rate is set only at each project’s own investment decision, and the availability target that gates floor payments was still a proposal in Ofgem’s July call for input, which expects to settle it after the awards. Ofgem’s consultation also proposes making the awards themselves conditional on delivery progress, with support it may withdraw.
ListingMinds · Published · Updated and sources verified
Geography: Great Britain · Procurement rounds covered: GB LDES cap and floor, window 1, closed
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A first-window award under Great Britain’s cap and floor for long duration electricity storage will not settle what a project’s floor is worth. Under the scheme, an approved project is paid when its assessed revenue falls below a set amount, in circumstances Ofgem sets, and pays back when it rises above one. Ofgem calls the floor a safeguard against downside risk rather than a target or a guaranteed return, and only a project that meets its Minimum Availability Target can draw on it. The floor’s default rate is set only at the project’s own final investment decision. The availability target was still a proposal in Ofgem’s call for input of , and Ofgem expects to take its final decisions on such proposals shortly after the awards. And in its June consultation, Ofgem says the awards themselves will be conditional on meeting delivery requirements, with support it may withdraw where they are not met.1, 2, 3, 4
Ofgem moved the floor rate from the window’s opening to the investment decision to reduce financing risk and support timely delivery: it is the yield of a sterling BBB bond index averaged over the 20 trading days before that decision, and the cap’s financial inputs follow the same date. The bids were assessed on indicative figures based on ; the rates in Ofgem’s documents, 4.47% at the floor and 7.48% at the cap in real terms, are indicative.1, 4 That spares a project a rate fixed at the window’s opening, but it also means the level of its floor is known only at its investment decision, after the award.
The availability target is set project by project and excludes planned outages and force majeure; in its July call for input, Ofgem is minded to lower the value proposed for pumped storage hydro from 95% to 92.5%.1, 3
Ofgem’s provisional list of , its minded-to decisions for window 1 and not final awards, has 16 projects with 7,645 MW, chosen from the 73 projects assessed after four of the 77 eligible withdrew. As of , Ofgem’s page for the consultation on that list shows it as “Closed (awaiting decision)”, and Ofgem still says it expects “to publish a final decision later in Autumn 2026, confirming which projects will be awarded a cap and floor regime”.4, 7, 8, 9
Those requirements, in the same consultation, are continued progress, ongoing viability and possibly time-bound milestones. Under the consultation, Ofgem may withdraw support where they are not met, and the requirements it intends to publish with the final awards would allow it to revoke the agreements of projects not making sufficient progress. It set the list’s capacity at the upper end of NESO’s advised range to allow for projects that drop out, and did not exclude projects on deliverability alone where a credible pathway remained open, intending to manage that risk through conditions.4 On the consultation’s terms, even a final award is a position a project keeps only by continuing to make sufficient progress.
What a successful project would carry: its own cost ceiling, delay repayments, and no expected way out
One term is fixed by the project’s own submission: window 1 projects submitted costs in three scenarios, P10, P50 and P90, and the P90 estimate is the Project Cost Ceiling. Well-evidenced overruns up to it enter the regulatory asset value unless demonstrably inefficient or wasteful; overruns above it are treated as inefficient by default, unless the project shows they could not have been predicted, reduced or avoided.1, 10 In effect, a project’s own P90 estimate is the most it can expect to recover.
Projects must be delivered by 2030 or 2033, depending on their track, extendable for force majeure to backstop dates of and . A project that misses its date without a recognised delay event or force majeure, or misses its backstop date, repays part of its future floor payments in proportion to the delay. The scale of that repayment rests on a backstop delay factor, still a proposal in Ofgem’s call for input of , which sets it at 0.05 for each three months of delay, or part of three months, up to 1.0.1, 3 Late delivery is paid for out of the floor, the protection the scheme exists to give.
Nor does an award come with a way out or early money: Ofgem’s application guidance does not expect a first-window project to have an option to opt out of the cap and floor licence conditions and operate as a merchant plant, and covers development spending under the regime for successful projects only, with no plans for advance development funding.11
| Term | What Ofgem has set | Standing in Ofgem’s documents |
|---|---|---|
| Floor and cap rates | The window 1 floor is by default an administrative rate based on the iBoxx GBP Non-Financials 15+ BBB index, in CPIH-real terms, set from the 20 trading days before the project’s final investment decision; a project-financed project may instead use its actual cost of debt, repaying any excess over the administrative floor before equity distributions. The cap rate comes from CAPM applied to 100% of the regulatory asset value. Indicative rates are 4.47% at the floor and 7.48% at the cap, CPIH-real.[1, 4] | Method decided; the default floor rate is set at the investment decision |
| Availability for floor payments | Access to floor payments depends on meeting a project-specific Minimum Availability Target, which excludes planned outages and force majeure. Ofgem’s licence call for input of , a proposal and not yet a rule, is minded to lower the target proposed for pumped storage hydro from 95% to 92.5%.[1, 3] | Principle decided; the target values are proposals, which Ofgem expects to decide shortly after the awards |
| Delivery dates and delay | Window 1 projects must be delivered by 2030 (Track 1) or 2033 (Track 2), extendable for force majeure to backstop dates of and ; a project that misses its date without a recognised delay event or force majeure, or misses its backstop date, repays part of its future floor payments in proportion to the delay. Ofgem’s licence call for input of , a proposal and not yet a rule, sets the backstop delay factor at 0.05 for each three months of delay or part of three months, up to 1.0.[1, 3] | Dates and repayment decided; the delay factor is a proposal |
| Cost ceiling | Window 1 projects submitted costs in three scenarios, P10, P50 and P90. The P90 estimate is the Project Cost Ceiling: well-evidenced overruns up to it enter the regulatory asset value unless demonstrably inefficient or wasteful; overruns above it are treated as inefficient by default, unless the project shows they could not have been predicted, reduced or avoided.[1, 10] | Decided |
| Revenue above the cap | Every successful window 1 project keeps 30% of revenue earned above the cap, up from the 10% consulted on.[1] | Decided |
| Revenue assessment | Revenue is assessed against the cap and floor every year or every five years, as the licensee prefers, on a net-present-value neutral basis over the whole regime; revenue above the cap in any year is paid back the following year.[5] | Decided |
| Gearing, assets and reporting | Ofgem has decided on an 80% gearing cap for window 1 projects; no disposal of assets, and no charges or liens over regulated assets, without its approval; no cross-default clauses in financing without its written consent; and annual financial reporting, including dividends and refinancing.[1] | Decided |
| Conditions on the award | In its window 1 minded-to consultation, Ofgem says final cap and floor awards will be conditional on meeting delivery requirements: projects must continue to make sufficient progress and show ongoing viability, may be subject to time-bound milestones, and Ofgem may withdraw cap and floor support where such conditions are not met. Ofgem intends to publish the delivery requirements, including conditions and milestones, with the final awards, and says they will allow it to revoke cap and floor agreements from projects that are not making sufficient progress.[4] | Ofgem’s stated intention, in a consultation; it intends to publish the conditions with the final awards |
| Exit and development costs | Ofgem does not expect window 1 projects to have an option to opt out of the cap and floor licence conditions and operate as merchant projects; development spending is covered under the regime for successful projects only, and there are no plans for advance development funding.[11] | Ofgem’s stated position |
| Changed connection dates | Ofgem does not revisit window 1 eligibility where the only change is a revised connection date or queue position under NESO’s connections reform; where the connection date is still unclear at award, it may grant the regime subject to deliverability conditions.[1] | Decided |
Source: Ofgem’s decisions, frameworks and guidance for window 1 (decided terms), its minded-to consultation (indicative rates, the conditions on the awards) and its licence call for input (proposals, and when Ofgem expects to decide them).1, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11
Floor payments run through the Balancing Services Use of System charge: NESO collects it from electricity suppliers, pays floor support to projects and reclaims revenue above the cap for consumers. In Ofgem’s assessment of impacts, as of , the floor exposure of the provisional list is around GBP 87 million a year in the central case and around GBP 171 million in a low-revenue case, about GBP 1 and GBP 2 per domestic consumer a year. Ofgem’s central view for the provisional list is no material net direct impact on consumer bills.1, 12 Because Ofgem’s central case already has the listed projects drawing on the floor, around GBP 87 million a year across the portfolio, we judge the proposed availability target to bear on some projects’ expected revenue, not only on their downside.
Most projects bid a residual value, which can lower their floor
Ofgem sets the cap and floor rates of return itself; the only terms projects compete on are regime duration and residual value, cut from the five parameters Ofgem consulted on for its financial framework. The default, decided in that framework after consultation, is a 25-year regime with zero residual value; a project may ask for a shorter regime, of at least 20 years, or a longer one, with evidence. With zero residual value, the regime assumes a project recovers all its capital investment over its term. A project may bid a non-zero residual value if its life outlasts the regime or to help lower the floor level, provided delivery does not suffer, and may propose a longer regime for a longer-lived asset, also to help lower the floor; Ofgem says recognising residual value can lower the floor price and make consumer-funded payments less likely.1, 5
In its provisional decisions, Ofgem is minded to refuse every request for a higher floor or a longer regime: the two regime variation requests, which sought a higher, inflation-linked floor, the one request for a longer regime and the two that combined a longer regime with a residual value. It is minded to accept 41 of the 45 requests for a residual value alone; most, it says, showed a value credible beyond the regime or one that reduced the floor, and the four it would reject tied residual value to negative decommissioning costs.4 With every request to vary or lengthen the regime set to be refused, residual value was the only lever left, and it is one that can lower a project’s own floor.
The outcome of those requests set the inputs to Ofgem’s Financial Assessment, which compares each project’s projected revenues with its floor level; the Economic Assessment ranked the projects as the starting baseline, and the Financial and Strategic Assessments were overlaid to decide whether to adjust that ranking. Ofgem takes the three assessments “in-the-round”, with no weightings set between them.4, 10 A residual value bid changes one input to one of those assessments; on its own, it does not decide selection.
The eight-hour minimum, and a list that runs well above it
The Electricity Act 1989, as amended by the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025, sets the threshold for any window: a long duration installation has a generating capacity of at least 50 MW and can generate at full capacity for at least eight hours in a row, and regulations may change the thresholds but not set the period below eight hours. Window 1 asked for at least 100 MW for stream 1 (technology readiness level 9) or 50 MW for stream 2 (level 8), discharging at full power for at least 8 hours and keeping that capacity and duration over the full regime of 25 years, among seven pass/fail criteria that a project had to pass in full. Projects that can be deployed without support, including any that have taken a final investment decision, are not supported.2, 5, 6, 13, 14
Of 171 applications made between 8 April and , Ofgem found 77 eligible on .14
| Technology | Applications | Found eligible | Ofgem’s provisional list of |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lithium-ion batteries | 112 (38.6 GW) | 48 (20.2 GW) | 11 (3,630 MW; 8 to 18.03 hours) |
| Pumped storage hydro | 8 (7.4 GW) | 5 (4.6 GW) | 3 (3,900 MW; 15 to 32 hours) |
| Vanadium flow / zinc batteries | 16 (2.6 GW) | 16 (2.6 GW) | 1 (65 MW; 8 hours) |
| Vanadium flow batteries | 20 (1.8 GW) | 5 (0.9 GW) | none |
| Liquid air with battery, hybrid | 4 (0.8 GW) | 2 (0.4 GW) | none |
| Compressed air | 3 (0.5 GW) | 1 (0.1 GW) | 1 (50 MW; 30 hours) |
| Iron-air batteries | 5 (0.4 GW) | none | none |
| Sodium-sulphur batteries | 2 (0.3 GW) | none | none |
| Hydrogen battery | 1 (0.1 GW) | none | none |
| All technologies | 171 (52.6 GW) | 77 (28.7 GW) | 16 (7,645 MW) |
Source: Ofgem’s eligibility outcome, Tables 1 and 3 (a technology missing from Table 3 had no eligible project); Ofgem’s minded-to consultation, Table 1.4, 14
On the provisional list, pumped storage hydro holds 3,900 of the 7,645 MW, in 3 projects of 15 to 32 hours: 51.0% by our calculation, against 48.3% for batteries of all kinds. By our count from Ofgem’s tables, three of the 11 lithium-ion batteries on the provisional list are rated at 8 to 8.7 hours and eight at 11.1 to 18.03 hours, and none of the ten lithium-ion projects of 1,000 MW or more that Ofgem assessed (nine at 8 hours, one of 1,800 MW at 8.7 hours) is on the list. Ofgem says the provisional portfolio has “a strong representation of higher-duration assets”.4 Eight hours was the minimum to qualify, not what won a place: the provisional list leans well above it, though on Ofgem’s account no single measure decided it.
What capacity markets and flexibility services pay for, by comparison, is covered in the capacity and flexibility guide.
After the awards: a possible second window, then licence changes
For projects left off the list, or not ready for the first window, Ofgem’s June consultation said it intends to consult in 2026 on the design of future windows, aiming to confirm by 2027 its intent to open a second window; there will be no automatic route into a future window, but projects unsuccessful in window 1 will not be excluded.4
On the timetable in Ofgem’s call for input of , final decisions on the licence conditions are expected shortly after the awards, a statutory consultation on the licence modifications in the first quarter of 2027 and final decisions on them in the second quarter of 2027; only then do the modified generation licences come into effect.3
Sources (14)
- 1
Ofgem: Decision, Financial Framework: LDES Window 1 Cap and Floor regime (OFG1164) · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Executive summary (p. 6): two bid parameters; sharing above the cap raised from 10% to 30%. Paragraphs 1.20 and 1.21 (p. 10): connections reform; deliverability conditions. Paragraphs 2.12 and 2.15 (p. 15) and 2.20(a) and (b) (p. 16): rates set administratively; regime duration and residual value. Paragraphs 3.8 and 3.9 (p. 24), 3.10(b), 3.11 and 3.12 (p. 25), 3.19, 3.22 and 3.23 (p. 27): the floor, the actual cost of debt option, the Minimum Availability Target. Paragraphs 4.6 (p. 29), 4.12 and 4.13 (p. 30) and 4.19 (pp. 31–32): the cap and the 30% sharing rate. Paragraphs 6.7 to 6.9 (pp. 41–42), 6.11 (p. 42) and 6.17 (p. 43): the cost ceiling, repayment for delay, the backstop dates. Paragraphs 7.5, 7.7 and 7.8 (p. 45): gearing, ringfencing, reporting. Paragraphs 8.3 (p. 46) and 8.7 (p. 47): payments through BSUoS. Paragraph 2.17 (p. 15) and 2.20(b) (p. 16): residual value can lower the floor. Paragraph 3.2(a) (p. 23) and 4.18 (p. 31): the 4.47% rate from market data of ; the reference date moved to FID. Paragraph 3.9 (p. 24): the floor as a safeguard, not a target or guaranteed return. Later documents checked: this decision replaces the consultation positions of (five bid parameters, 10% sharing, a 7.31% cap rate); Ofgem’s licence call for input of proposes values within it and decides nothing.
- 2
legislation.gov.uk: Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025, section 26, inserting section 10P into the Electricity Act 1989 (as enacted) · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Section 10P(1) and (2): the scheme and its purpose. Section 10P(4) and (5): payments to and from the electricity system operator licence holder below and above a specified amount; “assessed revenue”. Section 10P(8): the definitions of “long duration electricity storage installation” (at least 50 megawatts; at least eight hours at full capacity) and “specified”. Section 10P(9): regulations may change the figures, the period not below eight hours.
- 3
Ofgem: Call for input, Long duration electricity storage draft special licence conditions: minded-to decisions · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
P. 1, p. 5 and paragraph 1.6, Table 1 (pp. 6–7): final decisions on the special licence conditions shortly after the awards; statutory consultation expected in the first quarter of 2027; final decisions in the second quarter of 2027. Paragraph 2.47 (p. 18): the 95% availability target proposed for pumped storage hydro, liquid air and compressed air. Paragraph 2.51 (p. 19): minded to 92.5% for pumped storage hydro. Paragraph 2.93 (p. 25): the backstop delay factor, 0.05 for each three months, up to 1.0. A call for input with minded-to positions, not a decision; it updates the draft conditions of , and paragraph 1.6, Table 1 (pp. 6–7) places final decisions after the awards.
- 4
Ofgem: Window 1: Minded-to decisions – Long Duration Electricity Storage (consultation) · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Cover (p. 1): published . Executive summary (p. 6): 16 projects, 7,645 MW; future windows. Paragraph 1.2 (p. 7): four of 77 eligible projects withdrew, 73 assessed. Paragraphs 2.1 to 2.3 (p. 11): the portfolio; “a strong representation of higher-duration assets”; no single assessment or metric determined the outcome. Table 1 (p. 13): the 16 projects by technology, megawatts and duration. Paragraph 6.2 (p. 37): indicative rates of 4.47% at the floor and 7.48% at the cap. Paragraphs 6.4 to 6.12 (pp. 38–39): regime requests. Paragraph 8.6 (p. 62): just below 7,700 MW. Table 5 (pp. 64–66): every assessed project with technology, capacity and duration, counted by ListingMinds. Paragraphs 9.7 and 9.9 (p. 68): future windows. Chapter 2 introduction (p. 11), paragraphs 2.6, 2.9 and 2.10 (p. 12) and 9.3 (p. 67): conditional awards, withdrawal of support, revocation; projects not excluded on deliverability alone. Paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5 (p. 11) and 6.1 (p. 37): the order of the assessments. Paragraph 6.4 (p. 38) and 6.11 (p. 39): residual value requests and Ofgem’s reasons. Paragraphs 6.5 to 6.7 (p. 38), 6.9 and 6.12 (p. 39): what the regime requests sought. Later documents checked: Appendix: responses to questions from respondents, version 2.0, of , restates these pages and changes nothing used here; the consultation page notes a changed closing date of , which the file served now gives throughout (the file was created on ).
- 5
Ofgem and DESNZ: Long Duration Electricity Storage, Technical Decision Document · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Section 2.4 (pp. 16–17): a 25-year regime; a shorter one at least 20 years. Section 3.1, Table 2 (pp. 18–19): the eligibility criteria, streams and readiness levels, capacity and duration maintained over the regime. Section 3.2 (p. 19): planning. Sections 3.3 (p. 21) and 3.4 (p. 22): duration and capacity. Section 3.6 (p. 25): additionality. Section 3.7 (p. 26): refurbishments. Chapter 4, Table 3 (p. 28): preliminary and final cap and floor levels. Section 5.6 (p. 44): revenue assessment. Amendments checked: the Eligibility Criteria Assessment Framework (window one) no longer requires Outline Business Case cost estimates and does not make a generation licence an eligibility criterion; the Guidance for the cap and floor scheme application, window one, clarifies without changing any cited point. A sentence on p. 23 says stream 2 technologies should show 100 MW, against Table 2 and section 3.4 (100 MW for stream 1, 50 MW for stream 2); the page follows the table, as the eligibility framework does.
- 6
Ofgem: Eligibility Criteria Assessment Framework, LDES window one (Appendix 2 to the application guidance, OFG1164) · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Contents (p. 3): seven criteria. Paragraph 2.7 (p. 5) and paragraphs 2.9 and 2.10 (p. 6): pass/fail; every criterion. Section 3, “Deliverability” (pp. 7–8): the evidence, footnote 2 (p. 7) and “Licencing and permitting” (p. 8). “Grid connection offer” (p. 9) and “Planning consent” (pp. 9–10). “Minimum capacity” (p. 10) and “Duration” (p. 11). “Additional capacity” (p. 12).
- 7
National Energy System Operator (NESO): Long Duration Electricity Storage, Response to DESNZ Request for Advice, Q3 (Part 2), published with Ofgem’s minded-to consultation · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Page 3, “Recommendation on range”: an additional 2.7 to 7.7 GW for 2035 on top of existing capacity of 2.8 GW; Table 1 (p. 3), row 2035.
- 8
Ofgem: Long duration electricity storage window 1: minded-to decisions (consultation page) · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Page header, “Status”: “Closed (awaiting decision)”, as read on , and . The header gives a closed date of , the page text and the consultation document ; no fact on the page depends on it.
- 9
Ofgem consultation platform (Citizen Space): Long duration electricity storage window 1: minded-to decisions · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Section “What happens next”: the consultation closed and the expected final decision, as read on , unchanged when read on ; the “Related” section lists the consultation document, the assessment of impacts, NESO’s advice, the final methodology and the appendix of responses.
- 10
Ofgem: MCA Framework, Cap and Floor Project Assessment: Long Duration Electricity Storage (window one) · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Executive Summary (p. 5): Economic, Strategic and Financial Assessments, in-the-round, no weightings. Paragraphs 3.29 to 3.31 (p. 20): P10, P50 and P90 cost scenarios; the P90 case as the Project Cost Ceiling. Later document checked: the minded-to consultation applies this framework with the amendments it explains and keeps the three assessments without weightings (paragraphs 2.3 to 2.5, p. 11).
- 11
Ofgem: Guidance for the cap and floor scheme application, Long Duration Electricity Storage (window one) · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Appendix 1, FAQ 3 (pp. 19–20): preliminary and final cap and floor levels. FAQ 8 (p. 21): no expected option to opt out. FAQ 17 (p. 23): development expenditure for successful projects only; no advance development funding planned. The award timing in FAQ 3 and FAQ 4 was later moved by Ofgem; the page does not use it.
- 12
Ofgem: Assessment of impacts of the proposed LDES portfolio (supporting document to the minded-to consultation) · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Paragraph 4.4 (p. 15): no material net direct impact on consumer bills in the central case. Paragraphs 4.8 and 4.9 (p. 16): floor exposure of around £87 million a year, about £1 per domestic consumer a year, and around £171 million, about £2, in a low revenue scenario. Table 4 (p. 16) heads its consumer column “(£m/year)” but shows 1 and 2, the per-consumer figures of the text; the page follows the text.
- 13
legislation.gov.uk: Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025, section 26 (latest available, revised) · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Commencement Information, note I1: section 26 in force on , under section 118(1)(m). The text of section 10P is the same as in the enacted version.
- 14
Ofgem: LDES Eligibility Assessment Outcome, window 1 · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Page 1: the seven eligibility criteria. Executive summary and “Decision Making Timelines” (p. 4): window opened and closed ; 171 applications; 77 eligible, 94 not. Paragraph 2.4 (p. 6): pass/fail, every criterion. Paragraph 3.2 (p. 6) and Table 1 (p. 7): 52.6 GW; applications by technology. Paragraph 3.3 (p. 7) and Table 3 (p. 11): 77 eligible projects, 28.7 GW, by technology. A technology in Table 1 and missing from Table 3 had no eligible project.
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How to cite
ListingMinds, “Great Britain’s LDES cap and floor: winning an award does not fix what the floor is worth”, , updated . https://www.listingminds.com/energy/field-notes/ldes-cap-and-floor-great-britain