Battery storage · Sector guide
How battery storage is procured: what each scheme pays for, and what the winner gives up
Public schemes pay a large battery for different things: megawatt-hours of storage capacity, the share of its power a capacity market counts, a service priced after a grant, or credits settled against a market index. What a scheme pays for decides what the winner gives up and which risks it keeps.
ListingMinds · Published · Updated and sources verified
Markets and rounds covered: Italy, India, Great Britain, Belgium, United States, Kenya; 10 procurement rounds: 9 closed, 1 open
On this page
A battery has two ratings, its power in megawatts and the energy it can hold in megawatt-hours, and public schemes differ first in which of them, if either, they pay for. Italy’s MACSE, the mechanism through which Terna, the grid operator, buys new storage capacity, pays a yearly premium for every megawatt-hour contracted, and that capacity is made available to market operators through time-shifting products.1, 2, 3 Great Britain’s capacity market pays for derated capacity, the share of a battery’s power its rules count.4, 5 New York’s standard bulk storage contract buys none of a battery’s energy, capacity or ancillary services; it pays for credits settled against an index of market prices.6, 7
Each choice moves money and risk somewhere different. A MACSE winner hands the battery’s day-ahead use to the market and most of its balancing margin back; a capacity-market battery is paid only on the share of its power the rules count, and the rules can revise that share; a New York project that out-trades the index keeps the gain, and one that under-trades it bears the shortfall.
MACSE: a yearly premium, and the battery’s use handed over
Terna held the first MACSE auction on : developers offered storage capacity at a yearly premium per megawatt-hour, each winner was paid its own bid, and for lithium-ion the premium runs for 15 years, with the systems due in service in 2028. The auction contracted 9,968 MWh in four southern and island zones, at weighted average premiums from EUR 12,137 to EUR 15,846 per megawatt-hour a year by zone, against a reserve premium of EUR 37,000. Offers came to more than four times demand, according to Terna. Even the highest zonal average was under half the reserve premium, on our arithmetic.1, 2, 8, 9
Under the rules of ARERA, Italy’s energy regulator, the contracted capacity is made available to market operators through time-shifting products for the day-ahead market; for each system the winner names a balancing service provider, which offers the capacity not used that way on the balancing and redispatch market, and 80% of the contribution margin earned on it is returned.3 On committed power not scheduled through those products, the winner also pays back to Terna any positive difference between a reference price and a strike price, from the start of delivery, with an exemption, in the first calendar year of delivery, for the months before a system is built. To qualify, a participant also gives up any further incentive for the contracted share of its system. The premium is therefore what a MACSE winner really prices: most of the balancing margin goes back, and so does any amount by which the reference price exceeds the strike price.10
For the second auction, for storage delivering from 2029, ARERA proposed a reserve premium of EUR 22,000 per megawatt-hour a year in its consultation of . The reserve premium is the most an offer may ask, and on ARERA set it at EUR 27,000, below the first auction’s EUR 37,000. That ceiling is still above every zonal average the first auction produced.1, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13 Before the auction, each participant lodges a non-interest-bearing deposit of 10% of its qualified capacity times the reserve premium: EUR 2,700 for every megawatt-hour qualified, on our arithmetic.10, 12 Terna’s needs assessment of puts the national requirement at 16 GWh, which may be reduced before the quota is published.14
As of , Terna’s notice still sets the second auction for ; its deadline for deposits and declarations, , has passed; and Terna’s MACSE page lists no notice publishing the quotas.13, 15 Under the rules, Terna publishes the national quota and each area’s minimum and maximum at least 20 days before the auction.10
Capacity markets: paid on the share of power they count
A capacity market pays a battery on its derated capacity: in Great Britain a unit bids its derated capacity, and its yearly capacity payment is its capacity obligation multiplied by its price.4, 5 In Great Britain’s T-4 auction for delivery year 2029/30, the derating factor for battery storage was 43.96% at four hours of duration and 21.98% at two.16 Italy’s auction for delivery year 2027 set 67% and 44%, one value for every zone.17 Duration is paid for indirectly, as more megawatts that count.
For Italy’s auction for delivery year 2028, Terna revised its storage values on newer estimates of the storage authorised and expected before that auction, keeping them by macro-zone; ARERA, which found on that the revision met its criteria, noted that, other things equal, it reduces what new batteries contracted through the capacity market can be paid. The share that counts is set by the market’s rules for each delivery year, not by the bidder, and it can be revised against a battery before the auction is held.18
What a battery then keeps after each market’s penalties and payback above a strike price is compared for Great Britain, Belgium and Italy in the field note on one battery in three capacity markets; the capacity and flexibility guide explains the mechanism itself.
India: a grant first, then a fixed cost
India starts with the capital cost. On the Ministry of Power set viability gap funding, a public grant towards a project’s cost, of INR 1.8 million per megawatt-hour for 30 GWh of battery storage, 25 GWh shared among 15 states and 5 GWh for NTPC, INR 54 billion in all from the Power System Development Fund.19 Bidders compete on the annualised fixed cost they offer after the grant, quoted in rupees per MW per month or per kWh, under build-own-operate or build-own-operate-transfer contracts, preferably of 12 to 15 years. The guidelines prefer a 2-hour battery averaging 1.5 cycles a day, though the state utility or authorised agency procuring the storage may vary both.19
The grant is paid in three parts: 20% at financial close against a bank guarantee, 50% at commercial operation and 30% a year later. Projects must be commissioned within 18 months of signing the storage purchase agreement. Before any grant is released, the procuring entity obtains a bank guarantee equal to it, which can be encashed to recover the grant if the scheme’s conditions are not met.19 In the Odisha tender that the Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI) issued under this scheme on , the developer gives GRIDCO that guarantee, or an insurance surety bond, before each release except the last, and if its agreement is terminated within the first 2 years after commercial operation for reasons solely attributable to it, GRIDCO may recover the grant plus interest at SBI’s one-year MCLR plus 5%. So a developer whose Odisha agreement ends that way can be made to repay the grant with interest.20, 21, 22
SECI’s Kerala tender, issued on , before these guidelines, set its earnest money per megawatt-hour of quoted capacity; the Odisha tender set it per megawatt.19, 20, 21, 22 Reading a storage tender from the back works through what that does to a bid.
New York: a strike price settled against an index
On NYSERDA, the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, announced awards to eight bulk storage projects from its first solicitation, 950 MW once operational.23 Its standard agreement buys Index Storage Credits, one per megawatt-hour of discharge capability per day, each settled monthly at the strike price minus a reference price built from energy arbitrage and capacity prices of the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO); when the result is negative, the project pays NYSERDA. Projects are not required to take part in those markets, and keep their incentive to optimise revenue. Each proposer bid its own strike price and contract tenor, at most 15 years for lithium-ion and 25 for other technologies; NYSERDA could seek revised prices before award, and the agreement adjusts the price in set cases.6, 7
The field note on NYSERDA’s standard bulk storage contract follows the settlement, the availability test and the security a winner posts.
Great Britain’s cap and floor: a band around revenue, not a price
For long-duration storage, Great Britain has put a different model into statute: Ofgem must run a scheme under which, in circumstances it specifies, an approved installation’s operator is paid when its assessed revenue falls below a set amount, and pays when it rises above one. It covers installations of at least 50 MW that can generate at full capacity for at least eight hours in a row.24, 25 In the first application window, Ofgem sets the cap and floor rates of return itself; projects compete only on how long their regime runs and on the residual value they assume, the two left of the five parameters it consulted on, with a 25-year regime and zero residual value as the default. Every successful project in that window keeps 30% of the revenue it earns above the cap.26, 27 The regime puts a floor under revenue and takes most of what lies above the cap.
The field note on Great Britain’s cap and floor for long-duration storage sets out what the first window asked of projects and how they were assessed.
When the buyer owns the battery
Not every public tender buys a service. Kenya’s Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy Corporation (REREC) tendered battery replacement and upgrade works at seven existing solar mini-grids, with tenders due on . The contract price is a firm lump sum, not adjusted during the contract. Its bills of quantities nonetheless call their quantities “estimated and provisional”, and its site scope table and price schedules give different battery sizes at three of the seven sites. When the buyer owns the battery, the bidder is paid for equipment and works, and its risk sits in a specification whose quantities are provisional, not in a market.28
The field note on REREC’s battery replacement tender reads those figures site by site.
Prices quoted in different units
Where these schemes publish their prices, each is quoted in its own unit for its own thing, from a premium per megawatt-hour of storage capacity a year to a strike price per credit. A price from one scheme says little about another until both are restated for what they buy.
Reference
| Scheme | Example in this guide | What is paid for | How the price is set | Contract length |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Storage auction | Italy’s MACSE, first auction, | Storage capacity: a yearly premium per MWh | Each winner paid its own bid, up to a reserve premium ARERA sets for each auction | 15 years for lithium-ion in the first auction |
| Capacity market | Great Britain’s T-4 for 2029/30; Belgium’s Y-4 for 2029-2030; Italy’s auction for delivery year 2027 | Derated capacity: a price per kW or per MW a year | One clearing price in Great Britain; the marginal premium, up to a cap, for every selected offer in Italy; each bid its own price in Belgium | 15 years in Great Britain with capital expenditure of at least GBP 350 per kW of derated capacity; up to 15 delivery periods in Belgium and 15 years in Italy, for new capacity above an investment threshold |
| Agency tender with viability gap funding | India’s 2025 viability gap funding scheme | A storage service, after a grant per MWh | Bids compared on the annualised fixed cost, per MW per month or per kWh | Preferably 12 to 15 years |
| Index storage credit | NYSERDA’s first bulk storage solicitation | Credits, one per MWh of discharge capability per day, settled against a reference price from NYISO prices | The strike price each proposer bid | Bid by the proposer: at most 15 years for lithium-ion, 25 for other technologies |
| Cap and floor | Great Britain’s long-duration storage scheme, first window | A floor and a cap on the operator’s assessed revenue | Rates of return set by Ofgem; projects bid regime duration and residual value | 25 years by default |
Source: the rules, results and guidelines of each scheme, cited below.1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 19, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36
Where each scheme is announced
- Italy’s MACSE auctions: Terna’s MACSE page and its notices to operators.
- Italy’s capacity market: Terna’s capacity market page.
- Great Britain’s Capacity Market: the delivery body’s Capacity Market page.
- Belgium’s capacity auctions: Elia’s capacity remuneration mechanism pages.
- India’s storage tenders: the tender pages of the implementing agency, such as SECI.
- New York’s bulk storage solicitations: NYSERDA’s solicitations page.
- Great Britain’s cap and floor for long-duration storage: Ofgem’s long duration electricity storage page.
Sources (36)
- 1
Terna: press release, first MACSE auction concluded · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
P. 1: “10 GWh di capacità di accumulo”; “oltre quattro volte la domanda”; the reserve premium (“37.000 €/MWh-anno”); lithium-ion, in service in the year 2028. Later document checked: Terna’s updated results report of reduces the total to 9,968 MWh and the Sud e Calabria average to EUR 12,137.
- 2
Terna: MACSE rules (Disciplina), approved by ministerial decree of , the rules for the first auction · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Article 12.2 (p. 32). Later version checked: the rules approved on keep the same sentence as article 13.2.
- 3
ARERA: opinion 92/2026/I/eel to the Minister of the Environment and Energy Security on the storage requirement for MACSE · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Preamble, the paragraph on deliberation 247/2023/R/eel (p. 3): capacity assigned through time-shifting products for the day-ahead markets; a balancing service provider for each contracted system, offering the unused capacity on the balancing and redispatch market (MBR); 80% of the contribution margin returned.
- 4
The Electricity Capacity Regulations 2014 (SI 2014/2043), legislation.gov.uk, latest revised text · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Regulation 11(3) (thresholds per kilowatt of derated capacity); regulation 15(3) and 15(4)(a) (location; connection capacity of at least 1 MW); regulation 41(3A) (penalty caps); Schedule 1, paragraphs 3(2), 3(4), 3(5), 5(2A), 5(3), 6(4) and 6(5A). Amendments checked: SI 2025/183 substituted regulation 11(3) before the 2025 prequalification; SI 2026/850 changes none of the cited provisions; regulation 6(1) (the reliability standard).
- 5
DESNZ: Capacity Market Rules, informal consolidation of · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Rule 1.2, “Bidding Capacity” (p. 15); rules 3.2.3 to 3.2.9 (from p. 74); rule 3.4.1(g) and rule 3.4.2(a) (p. 81). Same wording in the consolidation of that applied to the 2029/30 auction. Amendments checked, none changing these rules: Capacity Market (Amendment) Rules 2026; Capacity Market (Amendment) (No. 2) Rules 2026; Capacity Market (Amendment) (No. 3) Rules 2026; Capacity Market (Amendment) (No. 4) Rules 2026; rules 8.5.1 and 8.5.2 (pp. 223–224); Schedule 4 (p. 311).
- 6
NYSERDA: ISCRFP25-1 Attachment A, Index Storage Credit Standard Form Agreement · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Pages are the agreement’s printed page numbers (the PDF page is the printed page plus two). Recitals (p. 1), the 6 GW goal adopted by the Commission’s order of ; §2.01, including (a) and (b) (pp. 13–14); §2.06 (p. 15); §15.01(a) to (c) (pp. 48–49); §15.02 (p. 49). Version: the agreement linked from NYSERDA’s public solicitations page (file SFA v11.18). It shows no date on its face; the RFP’s schedule has NYSERDA posting the final agreement on (RFP, Table 1, p. 15).
- 7
NYSERDA: Request for Proposals ISCRFP25-1, Long-Term Contracts to Purchase Index Storage Credits (ISCs), updated version · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Pages are the PDF’s page numbers, which match the printed ones. Version cited: the update of (original release ). §1.2 (pp. 14–15): the Index Storage Credit, its 20 MW / 80 MWh example, and what the strike and reference prices are meant to approximate; §2.1.4 (p. 19): the contract tenor; §2.6.1 (p. 26): the binding strike price; §3.2.1.i to iii (pp. 28–30): the settlement against the reference price.
- 8
Terna: updated results report, MACSE auction for delivery year 2028 · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Table 1 (marginal and weighted average premiums by zone) and Table 2 (capacity by zone, total 9,968 MWh) (p. 6); p. 7 (lithium-ion).
- 9
Terna: technical report (Relazione tecnica), lithium-ion batteries, MACSE auction for delivery year 2028 · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
P. 4, table of technical parameters, column for lithium-ion batteries: delivery period 15 years, planning period 2 years.
- 10
Terna: MACSE rules (Disciplina), approved by ministerial decree of · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Article 2.1(ttt) (p. 15), the reserve premium; article 3 (pp. 17–18) and footnote 5 (p. 31), the affidavit; article 6, the qualification requirements for new storage systems (pp. 21–22); articles 10.7 and 10.8 (p. 36), the quotas published at least 20 days before the auction; article 15.3 (p. 43); article 40 (p. 85), the pre-auction guarantee; article 41.1 (p. 86), a non-interest-bearing deposit.
- 11
ARERA: consultation document 283/2026/R/eel · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
P. 21, paragraph 3.17: a proposed reserve premium of EUR 22,000 per MWh per year.
- 12
ARERA: deliberation 332/2026/R/eel, the maximum premium for the MACSE auction with delivery year 2029 · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
The decision, point 1 (p. 11): the maximum premium for the second battery auction, planned for , “pari a 27.000 €/MWh/anno”; p. 10, the reasoning (“arrotondato al migliaio superiore”).
- 13
Terna: notice to operators, MACSE auction for delivery year 2029 · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
The notice of : its paragraph on the auction date (“si svolgerà il giorno 24 novembre 2026 a partire dalle ore 10:00”) and its table of deadlines, the row for articles 7.2 and 7.3 (“entro il 20 ottobre 2026”), re-read .
- 14
Terna: requirement for new storage capacity to 2029, approved by ministerial decree of · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
P. 4: a national requirement of 16 GWh, which may be reduced before the quota is published; Table 1 (minimum and maximum by zone).
- 15
Terna: MACSE page (Mercato a termine degli stoccaggi), list of notices to operators · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Section headed “Le comunicazioni di Terna”, the list of notices to operators, read (the page’s text sits in its embedded data): the newest is “News operatori del 6 agosto 2026 - Aggiornamento FAQ e pubblicazione sistemi informatici per la dichiarazione dei dati dei SdS”; no notice publishes the quotas of the auction with delivery year 2029.
- 16
National Energy System Operator (NESO), EMR Delivery Body: Capacity Market Auction Guidelines, 2025 T-4 auction, delivery year 2029/2030, version 1.0 · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Section 4.3, Table 3 (derating factors by generating technology class), “T-4 %” column, storage classes by minimum duration (p. 10 of 33).
- 17
Terna: Annex 3 to technical provisions DTF 2, delivery year 2027 · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Section 8.3, Table 11 (p. 32): batteries at 44% (2 hours) and 67% (4 hours). Later document checked: Terna’s consultation of on the delivery-2028 factors shows these values as the ones applied to capacity contracted up to the 2027 auction (Figure 2, p. 6).
- 18
ARERA: deliberation 370/2026/R/eel, conformity of Terna’s proposals for the capacity market’s technical provisions, delivery year 2028 · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Signed ; 11 pages. P. 10: the paragraph on the preamble of the decree of (Terna to consider holding the delivery-2028 auction after the “asta Macse 2029, programmata per il mese di novembre del corrente anno”); the paragraph on Terna’s communication of (the storage derating values revised on updated data on authorisations obtained and expected, “al netto di una stima della capacità che potrà essere selezionata nell’asta Macse 2029”, keeping the differentiation by macro-zone); the paragraph on new electrochemical storage (the derating revised upward, with a reduction, other things equal, of their remuneration in the capacity market). The decision, point 1 (p. 11): effective for the delivery-2028 auction only.
- 19
Ministry of Power, India: letter F.No. 48-15/7/2025-NRE and guidelines for viability gap funding of battery storage through the Power System Development Fund (scanned copy on the website of the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy) · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Pages of the scanned file: the letter (p. 1); the guidelines, sections 2.3 and 2.4, the disbursement schedule, the second section 2.5 (storage duration), sections 3.1 and 3.2 (p. 5); sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.8 (p. 6).
- 20
Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI): RfS for 125 MW / 500 MWh standalone BESS in Odisha with VGF through PSDF, RfS No. SECI/C&P/IPP/15/0015/25-26 · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Pages are the document’s printed page numbers. Bid information sheet (A) (p. 2) and field (H) (p. 3); clause 4.1 (p. 10); clause 12.2 (p. 24); clause 18.1 (p. 28); clause 19.1 (p. 30); clause 22.2 (p. 34); clauses 37.1 to 37.3 (p. 48; clause 37.3 refers to a clause 36.7 that the document does not contain); clause 39.1(a) (p. 51). Tender page documents checked: Amendment-01 corrects clause 18.1 to per MW and adds clause 3.9 (local content), other changes not cited; Clarifications-01 changes no cited clause; Annexures I to IV are reference documents.
- 21
Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI): Amendment-01 to the Odisha BESS RfS, Ref. SECI/C&P/IPP/15/0015/25-26/Amendment-01 · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Row 8, clause 18.1 (p. 2): EMD corrected to “INR 9,00,000/ MW (Rupees Nine Lakhs only/MW)”. Row 2, new clause 3.9 (p. 1): a minimum local content of 20% of the total project cost in BESS procurement, with an undertaking in Format 7.7A.
- 22
Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI): RfS for 125 MW / 500 MWh BESS in Kerala with VGF (ESS-3), RfS No. SECI/C&P/IPP/15/00018/24-25 · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Pages are the document’s printed page numbers. Bid information sheet (A), (H) and (K) (pp. 2–3); clause 12(b) (p. 23); clause 18.1 (p. 26); clauses 18.5 (p. 27) and 18.6 (p. 28); clause 19.1 and clause 19.2 note (p. 28); clause 22.3 (p. 32); clause 26.3 (p. 36); clauses 37.1 to 37.3 (p. 47; clause 37.3 refers to a clause 36.7 that the document does not contain); clauses 38.2 and 39.1(a) (p. 50); clause 39.2(a) (p. 51). Tender page documents checked: Amendment-01 changes clauses 8.1, 8.2 and 11, none cited; Clarification-01 (SECI000196-7902882) leaves the EMD and PBG unchanged and changes no cited clause; Revised Formats 7.3E and 7.3F change no cited clause. Two files named Clarification-01 are listed: Clarification-01 (SECI000196-2247627), uploaded at 19:12:54 on 27/01/2025, and SECI000196-7902882, uploaded at 19:15:35. The earlier file could not be opened. ListingMinds treats it as a failed upload, effectively superseded by the readable Clarification-01 uploaded three minutes later.
- 23
NYSERDA: press release, Awards Announced for New Bulk Energy Storage and Large-Scale Renewable Projects · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Date line (); opening paragraph (awards for eight new bulk energy storage projects); second paragraph (the result of NYSERDA’s first Bulk Energy Storage solicitation); section “New York’s First Bulk Energy Storage Awards”: first paragraph (950 MW once operational) and the paragraph after the list of projects (payments only from commercial operation; in service by the end of 2030, as the Commission’s 2024 order requires). The release also covers large-scale renewable awards, not used here.
- 24
legislation.gov.uk: Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025, section 26, inserting section 10P into the Electricity Act 1989 (as enacted) · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Section 10P(1) and (2): the scheme and its purpose. Section 10P(4) and (5): payments to and from the electricity system operator licence holder below and above a specified amount; “assessed revenue”. Section 10P(8): the definitions of “long duration electricity storage installation” (at least 50 megawatts; at least eight hours at full capacity) and “specified”. Section 10P(9): regulations may change the figures, the period not below eight hours.
- 25
legislation.gov.uk: Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025, section 26 (latest available, revised) · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Commencement Information, note I1: section 26 in force on , under section 118(1)(m). The text of section 10P is the same as in the enacted version.
- 26
Ofgem: Decision, Financial Framework: LDES Window 1 Cap and Floor regime (OFG1164) · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Executive summary (p. 6): two bid parameters; sharing above the cap raised from 10% to 30%. Paragraphs 1.20 and 1.21 (p. 10): connections reform; deliverability conditions. Paragraphs 2.12 and 2.15 (p. 15) and 2.20(a) and (b) (p. 16): rates set administratively; regime duration and residual value. Paragraphs 3.8 and 3.9 (p. 24), 3.10(b), 3.11 and 3.12 (p. 25), 3.19, 3.22 and 3.23 (p. 27): the floor, the actual cost of debt option, the Minimum Availability Target. Paragraphs 4.6 (p. 29), 4.12 and 4.13 (p. 30) and 4.19 (pp. 31–32): the cap and the 30% sharing rate. Paragraphs 6.7 to 6.9 (pp. 41–42), 6.11 (p. 42) and 6.17 (p. 43): the cost ceiling, repayment for delay, the backstop dates. Paragraphs 7.5, 7.7 and 7.8 (p. 45): gearing, ringfencing, reporting. Paragraphs 8.3 (p. 46) and 8.7 (p. 47): payments through BSUoS. Paragraph 2.17 (p. 15) and 2.20(b) (p. 16): residual value can lower the floor. Paragraph 3.2(a) (p. 23) and 4.18 (p. 31): the 4.47% rate from market data of ; the reference date moved to FID. Paragraph 3.9 (p. 24): the floor as a safeguard, not a target or guaranteed return. Later documents checked: this decision replaces the consultation positions of (five bid parameters, 10% sharing, a 7.31% cap rate); Ofgem’s licence call for input of proposes values within it and decides nothing.
- 27
Ofgem and DESNZ: Long Duration Electricity Storage, Technical Decision Document · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Section 2.4 (pp. 16–17): a 25-year regime; a shorter one at least 20 years. Section 3.1, Table 2 (pp. 18–19): the eligibility criteria, streams and readiness levels, capacity and duration maintained over the regime. Section 3.2 (p. 19): planning. Sections 3.3 (p. 21) and 3.4 (p. 22): duration and capacity. Section 3.6 (p. 25): additionality. Section 3.7 (p. 26): refurbishments. Chapter 4, Table 3 (p. 28): preliminary and final cap and floor levels. Section 5.6 (p. 44): revenue assessment. Amendments checked: the Eligibility Criteria Assessment Framework (window one) no longer requires Outline Business Case cost estimates and does not make a generation licence an eligibility criterion; the Guidance for the cap and floor scheme application, window one, clarifies without changing any cited point. A sentence on p. 23 says stream 2 technologies should show 100 MW, against Table 2 and section 3.4 (100 MW for stream 1, 50 MW for stream 2); the page follows the table, as the eligibility framework does.
- 28
Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy Corporation (REREC), Kenya: tender document, RFX No. 1000001594, battery replacement and upgrade works at seven solar mini-grids · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Pages are the printed page numbers (“Page N of 306”), which match the PDF pages. Cover (p. 1); Invitation to Tender, the title and item 1 (p. 8); TDS ITT 1.1 (p. 31); TDS ITT 19.7 (p. 33); TDS ITT 25.1, the deadline for tender submission (p. 34); Project Location table, “7No existing solar mini-grids” (p. 88); Summary of Specific Site Scope (p. 93); Bills of Quantities, Introduction (p. 189); price schedules, the battery item for each site (pp. 193, 197, 201, 206, 210, 214 and 218); SCC 11.2 (p. 276) and 12.3 (p. 277).
- 29
Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ): final auction parameters, T-1 and T-4 Capacity Market auctions · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Table 1 “Final auction parameters”, column T-4 2029/30: rows “Auction target capacity”, “Price Cap” and “15-year agreement threshold”. These final parameters replace the provisional ones of (target 39.1 GW, now 39.4 GW); the price cap and thresholds are unchanged; Table 1, column T-1 2026/27, row “Auction target capacity” (6.3 GW).
- 30
DESNZ: Capacity Market Auction Monitor Report, 2025 T-4 auction, delivery year 2029/2030 (prepared by Deloitte) · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Section 4, printed p. 7: the auction “started at 09:00 on ”; “The Clearing Price … was equal to £27.10”. The report gives the price without a unit; NESO’s announcement of gives it per kW per year.
- 31
National Energy System Operator (NESO): “Delivering reliability for GB consumers: the Capacity Market in action” · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Under the heading “T-4 Capacity Auction Results”: “a Clearing Price of £27.10/kW/year”. The same paragraph says the auction “concluded on ”; the clearing round closed on (source conflict resolved: the page gives the day the round ran).
- 32
Elia: Y-4 auction report for delivery period 2029-2030 · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
P. 6 (4,689.57 MW of derated capacity selected, 65 capacity market units); pp. 12 and 13 (weighted average price, EUR per MW per year).
- 33
Elia: CRM Functioning Rules, version 5 (), the rules for the 2025 auctions · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Paragraph 371, section 6.3.4 (p. 126): pay-as-bid. Later version checked: Functioning Rules version 6, of , replaces it for later auctions; the cited paragraph governed the 2025 auctions.
- 34
Terna: Disciplina del sistema di remunerazione della disponibilità di capacità produttiva, as approved by ministerial decree of and amended on , adapted to the new dispatching code, in force from · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Article 8.1a.X (p. 21); article 23.1(b) (p. 39); article 27.3(b) and (c) (p. 44). Amendment checked: ARERA deliberation 569/2025/R/eel, with its alignment of these rules approved on , applies to contracts only after the delivery-2027 auction, and keeps article 51.1 bis.
- 35
Royal decree of on the investment thresholds of the CRM (consolidated text, Justel) · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Article 6 §1 (EUR 360, 239 and 106 per kW for up to 15, 8 and 3 delivery periods); article 1, 4° (kW: the power at a delivery point). Amendment checked: the royal decree of amends the decree, including a threshold of EUR 30 per kW for existing capacity (article 19/5); the cited consolidated text includes its changes.
- 36
ARERA: deliberation 199/2024/R/eel of · Tier 1 · official · Verified
Where in the document
Article 2.1 (p. 21): the minimum investment is “215.000 euro/MW”.
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ListingMinds, “How battery storage is procured: what each scheme pays for, and what the winner gives up”, , updated . https://www.listingminds.com/energy/guides/battery-storage